Constitutionalism, at its core, embodies the principles of the rule of law, protection of fundamental rights, institutional integrity, and the constitutional limitation of governmental power. It represents a culture in which people, organisations, and governments all act in accordance with these values. Generally, by limiting governmental authority and widening the scope of individual rights, constitutionalism ensures a balance of power and accountability within society.

In the context of Bangladesh, the culture of constitutionalism has been a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it upholds constitutional supremacy and provides remedies for rights violations by liberalising rights, particularly through judicial review. On the other hand, it advances an over-reliance on constitutional provisions, often at the expense of ordinary laws, creating a hierarchy where non-constitutional laws are perceived as less significant. This dynamic might be simultaneously beneficial and problematic. While the rigidity of constitutional amendments prevents drastic and hasty changes, it has also made constitutional engineering vulnerable to political misuse. Consequently, in practical scenarios, constitutionalism in Bangladesh often fails to function effectively due to power hegemony, even though its jurisprudential ethos remains fascinating.

Grounded in the principle of popular sovereignty, a constitution’s identity is inherently influenced by the values, identity, and will of the people it represents. In Bangladesh, however, this relationship has been paradoxical. The phrase “We, the people of Bangladesh,” as the makers of the Constitution in its Preamble, symbolizes the Constitution’s democratic foundation; yet the document frequently fails to reflect the collective will of the people. This paradox in constitutional science stems from the circular logic inherent in constitutionalism: the constitution derives its legitimacy from the people, while the people rely on the constitution to shape their collective identity. This ‘chicken-and-egg’ dilemma underscores the fragility of constitutional identity in Bangladesh, as any disruption on one side of this relationship (such as political misuse of the constitution or public disillusionment) inevitably destabilises the other side.

Historically, constitutionalism in Bangladesh has been power-centric rather than people-centric. For instance, amending the constitution has often been easier than reaching out to the people and truly listening to their voices. Nevertheless, the constitution of 1972, hailed as a symbol of liberation, has remained a baseline for constitutional interpretation. However, this founding document has become brittle because it hasn’t changed to meet the needs of society. The July Mass Uprising of 2024 (which led to the ousting of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina) stands as a testament to the consequences of this pseudo-culture of constitutionalism, raising a critical question: Was the root of constitutionalism inherently weak? If not, how have frequent amendments, for instance, the 4th (introduced one-party rule) and the 16th (provided power to the Parliament to remove Supreme Court judges), diluted its core principles, creating an ever-growing disconnect from its original ethos? This gradual deviation has widened the gap between the original and the present constitution to such an extent that there appears to be no path of return, leaving the constitution increasingly vulnerable. In the immediate post-July period, it seemed that there was little fundamental difference between amending the current constitution and drafting a new one, as both appeared to lack the spirit and sacredness of the original, prompting discussions of creating an entirely new constitution. However, after extensive scholarly debate, it became evident that, within such a short period, drafting a new constitution is impractical, and the challenges posed by resource and political constraints undermine the possibility of fully restoring constitutionalism. Instead, major constitutional changes were decided through referendums (yes/no votes). It is important to note that Bangladesh recently held a referendum on the same day as the national elections on 12 February 2026, addressing four key questions, including that remaining reform commitments in the July Charter should be carried out according to parties’ pledges. The victory of ‘Yes’ reflects the ‘people’s willingness’(which is constitutionally the ultimate source of all power) to implement reforms under the July Charter.

Reform initiatives already undertaken (those proposed by the Constitutional Reform Commission) seek to address this fragility by advancing liberal, pluralist, and transformative constitutionalism. The proposed changes include replacing the principles of nationalism, socialism, and secularism with equality, human dignity, social justice, and pluralism. Such reforms, particularly the expansion of fundamental rights, efforts to build a more inclusive society and the redress of inequality, undoubtedly reflect a positive transitional constitutional culture. However, it also raises a question: could drastically altering most of its characteristics, or any deviation from strict constitutional provisions, create an identity crisis for the Constitution? If so, that would pose a threat to social stability, as traditionally, our social fabric cannot remain sustainable without upholding constitutional norms as its genome. That being said, it is important to remember that Bangladesh’s tendency to interpret the constitution through a rigid, textual lens can further complicate its identity, especially concerning its inherent adaptability.

When it comes to the matter of identity, Article 7B of the constitution inevitably becomes a focal point. Article 7B, which enshrines the basic structure doctrine, precluded any changes to the constitution, effectively paralysing nearly half of it.  However, the High Court Division, in a recent ruling, declared that article as unconstitutional and removed it. Consequently, it will in future effectively eliminate the basic structure doctrine from our legal system. As an optimist, I can legitimately hope that, once this extraordinary situation of power unravels following the July Revolution of 2024, no political party will dare to drastically alter our constitution or exercise supra-constitutional authority for their own gain. Moreover, under the suggested reforms, the ruling party will no longer be allowed to amend the Constitution unilaterally; instead, major constitutional changes will require approval through a referendum.

In conclusion, Transformative Constitutionalism in Bangladesh must strike a balance between limiting governmental power and protecting individual rights. As the source of all power, the people, as mentioned in the preamble, should also bear the responsibility of protecting constitutional integrity and ensuring that it serves their best interests.